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références,  est  un  cas  emblématique  d’« oblitération  par  incorporation ».  Les 
concepts de « sentiments de motivation » et de « conflit », qu’on peut trouver 
dans l’œuvre de Pareto, jouent en effet un rôle crucial dans l’analyse de Merton, 
ouvrant  de  nouvelles  perspectives  dans  la  conceptualisation  d’un  environne-
ment et de structures sociaux en tant qu’éléments de l’action. La structure de 






two traces of pareto in merton’s effort toward 






Robert K. Merton acknowledged many times the influence that 
Émile  Durkheim, Max Weber, and George Simmel exercised on his training 
and his early work. But he never referred to Vilfredo Pareto.1 Yet, Pareto’s influence 
on the young Merton is clear, and some of his issues, though faced with a comple-
tely different sociological style of reasoning, crossed and characterized Merton’s 
thought. In fact, some of the focal elements of Merton’s sociology, i.e. motiva-
ting sentiments and conflict, are also central in Pareto’s sociology. Furthermore, 
Merton never acknowledged how his paradigm of functional analysis was very 
close to the way in which Pareto had discussed the problem of utility.2 Why did 
not Merton recognize this? Essentially for two reasons. The first, concerns the 
mechanism of obliteration by incorporation – OBI, in the acronym created by 
Merton; the second, regards the way in which Talcott Parsons read Pareto. 
Obliteration by incorporation is the means Robert K. Merton used to unders-
tand and explain the patterns of historical transmission of knowledge. The oblite-
ration of ideas by their incorporation concerns accepted knowledge3 and involves 
the process of selective accumulation of ideas, i.e. the way in which the members 
1  Reconstructing  Merton’s  familiarity  with  European  sociological  thought,  Lewis  Coser 






between various types of utility […]. Among these […]  if an  individual or a community  is 
subject to various degrees of benefits and detriments, in principle it is possible to find a net 
utility, what Merton  termed a  ‘net balance of  consequences’  […] or  […]  the question of 
‘latent functions’ [viewed as] an ‘unintended consequence’ of action. But how does this differ 
from Pareto’s ‘incidental’ effects, e.g., obtaining T’’ while aiming at T?” (2003, p.208). In the 





of his 3rd enlarged edition of Social Theory and Social Structure (1968 [1949]), analyzing the 
relationship between the history of thought and theoretical systematic (see expecially the 
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of scientific communities practice their relationship with the ideas of authors 
considered classics. So, obliteration by incorporation is a conceptualization of the 
relationship with the classicality. The quotation from Alfred North Whitehead, 
chosen as an epigraph for Social Theory and Social Structure (1968 [1949]), is emblema-
tic: “A science which hesitates to forget its founders is lost”. To forget the foun-
ders means to leave the analysis of their work to the historians of science, and use 
them only as a starting point to explore and analyze social phenomena, defined 
in space, time and in their specific conformation of meaning. Is this the fate of 
Pareto’s heritage in Merton’s thought? It seems yes: a self-exemplifying case of 
obliteration by incorporation. 
But obliteration by incorporation could apply also to other classics, not only 
to Pareto. The question remains: why did not Merton recognize the influence 
of Pareto but acknowledged the influence of other classics? A possible answer 
involves the process of selective appropriation that affected Pareto’s work 
when his thought was introduced in American sociology (see on this point 
Chazel, 1999). Pareto had perhaps a decisive influence on the development of the 
American sociological theory of the first half of nineteenth century. The notions 
of social system and social equilibrium have become part of sociological voca-
bulary, giving birth to debates and attitudes which have animated sociology and 
have, certainly, contributed to its establishment in the public space and in the 
processes of academic institutionalization. Talcott Parsons and George Homans, 












sometimes  becomes  identified  as  the  originator.  In  the  successive  transmission  of  ideas, 
repeated  use may  erase  all  but  the  immediately  antecedent  versions,  thus  producing  an 
historical palimpsest in which the source of those ideas is obliterated” (Merton, 1979, p.vii).
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two among the best sociologists of that generation, have certainly contributed 
to the reception of Pareto’s thought overseas.4 The first, in The Structure of the 
Social Action (Parsons, 1937), finding him a place in the pantheon of the clas-
sics of sociology; the second, writing, in 1934, an introduction to his thought. 
Both had been part of the so-called Harvard Circle, which, between 1932 and 
1934, under the direction of Lawrence Henderson, had read and commented 
almost the whole work of Pareto.5 The leading idea, that these authors shared 
and that they thought came from Pareto, was that society could be studied as a 
mechanical model, as a system which contained in itself the tendency to equi-
librium, to homeostasis. Henderson, who was a bio-chemist, and influenced 
Homans in the Thirties (lately, in fact, Homans would have rejected the very 
possibility of studying the equilibrium of a human group in the same way as we 
study the organism of an animal affected by an infection) considered homeos-
tatic processes of living organisms as the consequence of Ippocrates’s vis medica-
trix naturae – a principle according to which organisms have an innate ability of 
auto-recovery. For Parsons, who comes in contact with Pareto’s thought through 
Henderson, the equilibrium of a system means ultimate ends and value atti-
tudes common to the members of a society as one of the essential conditions of 
the equilibrium of social systems. In this way, the elements of a social system 
are for Parsons mean-ends schemes and values rather than residues, interests, 
derivations, and social heterogeneity as they were in Pareto. The change could 
4  The  Trattato di sociologia generale  was  translated  in  english  by  Andrew  Bongiorno  and
Arthur Livingstone at the beginning of the 1930s. It was published in four volumes, in 1935, 





5  For  Barbara  Heyl  (1968),  in  the  fall  of  1932  Lawrence  Henderson  organized  a  seminar 
on  Pareto’s  sociology.  The  group  consisted  of George C. Homans, Charles  P. Curtis,  Jr., 
Lawrence J. Henderson, Joseph Schumpeter, Talcott Parsons, Bernard DeVoto, Crane Brinton, 
Elton Mayo, Henry Murray, Clyde Kluckhon, and Robert Merton. Among the members of 




not have been more radical: from a conception in which the equilibrium of the 
social system was conceptualized as a function of the conflict, to one in which 
it is only a function of consent or of a peaceful coexistence. 
Another assiduous frequenter of the seminar on Pareto held by 
Henderson was the young Robert K. Merton.6 His intellectual curiosity lead 
him to attend the seminar, just like he subsequently would have attended to 
Parsons’ seminars, which were the basis for The Structure of Social Action. As it 
is well known, Harvard has been described by Merton himself as a micro-
environment full of stimuli and intellectual influences, often very different 
and multi-disciplinary. Pitirim Sorokin – the founding chair of the Harvard 
Sociology Department – who convinced Merton to move to Harvard to enrich 
his education and chose him as his research assistant, the science histo-
rian George Sarton, Parsons himself, and the Harvard Circle are the knots 
of a complex net of relationships, influences and socio-cognitive contexts 
that Merton will develop and widen more and more. Despite the impor-
tance that Sorokin and Sarton had in the development of Merton’s scienti-
fic and cognitive interests, Parsons and the group of Herderson influenced 
to a greater extent his style of reasoning and of sociological analysis. As 
Craig  Calhoun has written in the introduction of a volume dedicated to 
Merton published in 2010, and specifically referring to the experience he 
made in Hendersons’ seminar, “Pareto’s idea of ‘motivating sentiments’ was 




publications of that period: The Unintended Consequences of Purposive Social Action, published 








to Pareto in Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England.
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But, as it is known, Merton developed this idea, which will be crucial for his 
further scientific work, in a different way than did Pareto and, above all, Parsons. If 
Henderson and Parsons, especially the latter, had introduced Merton to the knowle-
dge of European sociological thought, he started nonetheless to mark a distance 
from their way of approaching the sociological ideas of classics. Rather than in 
accordance, Merton built his sociological identity in disagreement, for difference rather 
than for identity. Especially from Parsons: “although much impressed by Parsons as 
a master-builder of sociological theory, I found myself departing from his mode of 
theorizing” Merton wrote remembering those years (1994, p.16, italics added).
During the years, he built his method of doing sociology in an opposite 
way than Parsons and Pareto did: to the formulation of large scale and abstract 
theories, and to the construction of systems from the top down, he contrasted 
the careful and patient activity of the empirical researcher theorist, who creates 
conceptual tools and middle-range theories to focus the results of empirical 
researches, and to interpret them beyond the immediate data, and, at the same 
time, uses empirical research to test theoretically fruitful ideas. 
Pareto’s idea of motivating sentiments was one of these: a fruitful idea 
on the theoretical level that, however, needed to be applied to research stra-
tegies – possibly systematic ones. Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century 
England, published in 19388, represents the place in which the whole of Merton’s 
sociological knowledge is represented. As Steven Shapin (1987) has noticed, 
Pareto plays a crucial role in the construction of this dissertation, especially 








and Society in Seventeenth-Century England in the monograph series he had just established as 
a complement to Isis: entitled, naturally enough, Osiris: Studies on the History and Philosophy of 
Science, and on the History of Learning and Culture. I did not refuse the offer” (1977, p.64).
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mes, ideological articulations – play within the so-called “Merton thesis”9. In 
this sense, the whole of the constitutive values of Puritanism, starting from 
sermons, reflected and reinforced the dominant sentiments.10 So, Puritanism 
represents not only a corpus of ideas that direct action into specific ways, but 
especially the choice between alternative ways of action, all equally compa-
tible with underlying sentiments. For Merton, “without such guidance and 
direction, non-logical action would become, within the limits of the value-
system, random” (1938, p.450).11 
The most important aspect of Merton’s interpretation of Pareto regards 
the distinction between residues and derivations, that, for Merton, are opera-
tionally separated by an uncertain line because, in practice, “once aware of 
the strong emotional charge which certain religious convictions carried at the 
time, we may find it justifiable to treat these as residues rather than derivations” 
(1938, p.450, n.30). In this way, Merton introduces a remarkable difference 
from Pareto: to treat mental schemes, ideological convictions, and systems of 
ideas as residues rather than derivations, as constant elements that provide 
motivations for behavior rather than variable elements near to post factum justifi-
cations. In order to make this effort successful, the underlying sentiments must 
be treated as psychological statements immediately understandable rather than 
individual dispositional attitudes or elements of a complex mentality.12 
9  Steve Shapin (1987) and Gary Abraham (1983) pointed out that the historians misunders-
tood Merton’s thesis because they undervalued the crucial role of motivating sentiments in 














Only from the beginning of the 1940’s, when he was called to Columbia 
University, and after that he had started his collaboration with Paul Lazarsfeld, 
this idea of constant elements that provided to motivating sentiments became a 
research program, both theoretical and empirical, to the point that it is present 
in all his work in the following years. However, the way in which Merton used 
this idea had nothing in common neither with any Paretian residues nor with 
Parsons’ pattern-variables model. In other words, it was necessary to individuate 
in the structure of interaction which mental schemes and which definition of 
the situation were selected by the acting subjects, and which consequences 
they produced – anticipated, non anticipated, positive or negative. The creation 
of a theory of behavior according to reference groups, which could connect 
the extreme variability of the data gathered by systematic empirical research, 
is an emblematic case of conceiving constant elements and motivating senti-
ments as research-problems. After the appearance of the first two volumes of 
The American Soldier (Stouffer, 1949), Merton worked on the theoretical idea of 
reference group. In this effort, he changed his approach to the social environ-
ment as source of action. So, Merton conceptualizes social environment as an 
“element within the core process of action as a direct object of study”, rather 
than a predisposition, to the point that “one could interpret Merton’s several 
approaches to the ‘social structure’ as an increasing widening of the ‘stimulus’ 
idea” (Lazarsfeld, 1975, p.54 and p.56). As it is known, “stimulus idea” for 
Paul Lazarsfeld is equivalent in meaning to “motivating sentiments”. 
The basis for the development of the theory of behavior according to refe-
rence groups is the wide variety of systematic empirical data made available 
through a thorough review of the first two volumes of The American Soldier.13 The 
general idea is that some of the interpretations as contained in the original 
13  In the following pages are synthesized the main results discussed by Merton in chapter X (writ-
ten with Alice Kitt Rossi and originally published in Continuities in Social Research. Studies in the 
Scope and Method of “The American Soldier”, edited by Merton and Lazarsfeld in 1950) and in 
chapter XI of Social Theory and Social Structure (1968 [1949]), 3rd enlarged edition, p.279-440.
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research report, although they would allow to account for multiple, conflicting 
and seemingly paradoxical data structures, however, were not able to identify 
any invisible uniformity of social processes capable of integrating all of these 
interpretations. Analyzing again the main empirical results, Merton, with the 
assistance of Alice Kitt Rossi, assumed that it is possible to make, along with 
the interpretations based on psychological and cognitive models of the two 
concepts in question, also an interpretation based on sociological models, in 
the sense of an analysis of “their modeling by the social structure in which 
they occur”. The behavior and attitudes of the subjects, in this case, are not 
only studied as dispositional effects, but as positional and relational effects. 
Proceeding towards a new analysis of the main research results of The 
American Soldier, organizing and systematizing the form of specific contribu-
tions to the theory of reference groups, Merton specifies what constitutes 
such a theory and how it is related with the notions of “relative deprivation”, 
“social reference scheme”, “models of expectations” and so on. First of all, the 
problem is to put in evidence under what specific conditions processes are activated 
that can be interpreted as “relative deprivation”, “social reference schemes” 
are established and “models of expectations” are structured and “situations” 
in which individuals are involved are “defined” in one way rather than another. 
Why, in other words, among the many possible social reference schemes or 
potential alternatives to models of expectations, subjects choose those rather than 
others? And what conditions facilitate or hinder the selection?
The simultaneous belonging of individuals to different groups (or, in gene-
ral, their holding of multiple positions within society, which Merton defines as 
status-set) forces the sociologist to define, case by case, with which group, among 
the many to which the individual belongs (or aspires to belong), he establishes 
any form of comparison or evaluation of his situation. Since multiple affilia-
tions and multiple reference groups are possible, the theory of behavior accor-
ding to reference groups covers both the cases in which the selection of the 
groups occurs among groups to which individuals belong, and also the cases in 
which it occurs among groups to which they do not belong. 
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Being dynamic processes, the identification of these processes of selection is 
only possible in the case where the researcher is able to specifically “characterize 
the structure of the social situation” within which the different memberships 
and/or non-memberships are selected as meaningful contexts of comparison. 
In this way, he will be able to interpret and explain apparently anomalous and 
paradoxical results. Three examples, drawn from The American Soldier, illustrate the 
task that Merton assigned to the theory of reference groups.
The first of these examples, which has now become a classic, concerns the 
satisfaction with reference to the promotion system expressed by soldiers of some 
military bodies (such as the Military Police) where promotions were rare, in 
comparison to the dissatisfaction expressed by soldiers in other military bodies 
(such as the Air Corps) where promotions were more frequent. All things being 
equal, maintaining levels of seniority, rank and education constant, the data struc-
ture provided an interesting problem of interpretation. Only the reconstruction of 
a possible causal chain can provide this explanation. Since a high social mobility 
(career advancements) may increase excessively the level of expectations of the 
members of a group, then they are more likely to experience a sense of acute frus-
tration with regard to their present positions and of dissatisfaction with regard to 
their future possibilities of mobility. However, this possible explanation considers 
only partially the multiplicity of social situations potentially associated with this 
situation. For example, all things equal, in the structuring of evaluations, which 
mobility rates will prevail: those that exist among individuals who are “in the 
same boat” or those that exist among individuals who are not “in the same boat”? 
And, in what conditions, referable to the structure of social situations, does an evaluation 
derived from a comparison with the successes (or failures) of other individuals 
considered significant give rise to feelings of frustration and personal inadequacy 
or produce feelings of injustice in relation to the functioning of those institutions 
that should ensure the relationship between individual merit and social reward?
The second example illustrates how the response patterns of recruits trans-
ferred to veteran departments seemed, apparently, to follow incidental, badly 
structured and ambiguous changes. Since the recruits could find themselves in 
two completely different social structures, in homogeneous divisions, composed 
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exclusively of recruits, or in divisions composed of veterans, the research identi-
fied three possible types of soldiers: recruits in divisions of only recruits, recruits 
in divisions of veterans and veterans in these divisions. Aptitude questions were 
put to the soldiers of these groups concerning their will to fight, their confi-
dence in their own abilities in assuming the responsibility of leading a team 
and their judgment of their own physical conditions. As a result, the authors of 
The American Soldier identified completely different response patterns which, begin-
ning from the recruits in divisions of veterans, can be briefly summarized as 
follows. In the first case, the will to fight, their responses rates approached those 
of veterans and were distant from those of the other recruits in homogeneous 
departments; in the second case, the confidence in ability to command, their 
response rates were very distant from those of veterans and significantly distant 
from those of other recruits; in the third case, the judgment of physical conditions, 
the response rates of the two groups of recruits were almost super-imposable.
Why do the data show this structure? Why so significant a difference 
in the first two cases between soldiers who had the same characteristic of 
being recruits, though differed with respect to the group in which they found 
themselves, and no difference in the last case? The introduction of a specific 
hypothesis, derived from the theory of behavior according to reference groups, 
prevents these response patterns from producing a proliferation of interpreta-
tions that, in some cases, are ad hoc and post-factum. The hypothesis is as follows: 
new members of a group (e.g. the recruits), if motivated, will tend to assimilate 
the norms (and values) that are typical of the new group (e.g the veterans). 
Compliance with these norms allows individuals to be accepted by the group 
as legitimate members, and being considered legitimate members reinforces 









The third example concerns the occurrence of promotions within the army. 
Which individuals had the greatest chance of being promoted? Data from a longi-
tudinal study, carried out at different time intervals on three groups of soldiers, 
had put in evidence that individuals who had expressed attitudes conforming 
to official military rules had subsequently received promotions at significantly 
higher rates than soldiers who had not expressed the same attitudes. Therefore, 
the higher the compliance with rules and practices officially approved by the 
military, the higher the social mobility. But which individuals adapt better than 
others to the structure of this situation? Also in this case returns the notion of 
conformity to norms. However, differently from previously, where compliance 
was linked to the membership group (the recruits in the divisions of vete-
rans who assimilate the values of the new group), here compliance takes on a 
perspective value: it is, in fact, used for the purposes of career advancement, 
or as assimilation of values that characterize a group (of officers) of which 
the individuals in question are not members but aspire to be. Social confor-
mity here is structurally different from compliance with the standard norms 
and expectations of the group to which individuals belong. The aspiration of 
becoming a member of a group one does not currently belong, while it helps 
to select elements of the regulatory structure of that group to emphasize, in 
order to adapt and modulate one’s own behavior, at the same time produces 
concrete acts that are not in compliance with the expectations of the group one 
currently belongs but that comply substantially to the expectations of the group 
one does not belong. It is the mechanism of anticipatory socialization that makes 
it possible to select a positive orientation toward groups of non-belonging. This 
allows us to explain the different rates of promotion within the structure of the 
army through the identification of the reasons for this difference in the subjective 
disposition to assimilation of norms typical of a group of non-belonging and 
through a characteristic of the social structure oriented to reward conformist 
behaviors rather than merit. As stressed before, the mechanism of anticipatory 
socialization allows the identification of a positive and subjective anticipation 
of the assimilation of values that characterize a group of non-belonging and a 
characterization of the structure of opportunities. It is therefore necessary to 
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consider explicitly, along with the positive functions of this mechanism, also 
the possible consequences that it can (or could) have for the equilibrium of the 
subject who adopts it and that of his original group of belonging, and for the 
stability of the entire social structure involved in these processes.
3. MOTIVATING SENTIMENTS AS MODELS AND LEVELS OF 
ASPIRATIONS AND OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE 
As one can easily imagine, these issues, as well as being highly topical, are 
crucial for the study of two of the most important aspects of complex indus-
trialized societies: models and levels of aspirations, and the configuration of 
the opportunity structure. How do models and levels of aspirations take shape? 
How do they relate to the structure of opportunities? Under what conditions 
do individuals decide to come into play or to abstain?15 Returning to our speci-
fic example, while a positive orientation towards the official values of the army 
legitimizes and maintains the structure of authority of the army, at the same 
time it undermines the solidarity and cohesion of small primary groups to 
which the soldier belongs. This is because the assimilation of the conflicting 
norms of another group necessarily means infringement of the norms of the 
original group, especially in the case where such an infringement may bring 
about a career advancement within the structure of authority. 
Let me consider, first of all, the entire process from the point of view of 
the individual positively oriented towards a non-membership group of supe-
rior status. The mechanism of anticipatory socialization would have a positive 
consequence for the individual only within an open social structure, that is a social 
structure allowing actual mobility, while it would have a negative and destabili-
zing effect to the individual within a closed social structure. But the distinction 
is purely analytical, since in empirical concreteness the two systems are often 






mixed and without a clear-cut line of discrimination. Not only are there relati-
vely open social structures and relatively closed social structures but, paraphra-
sing Merton, one might say that it would be necessary to investigate the relativity 
of the openness or closedness of such systems. This is the well-known issue 
affecting complex societies which are considered open societies with a strong 
social mobility. But what determines the practicability of ascending the social 
structure? In the example we are considering, that of promotion rates, it would 
seem to depend on a conformist assimilation of the norms of the structure of 
authority rather than an impartial recognition of individual merits. If you add to 
this the perception, by some soldiers, of a discretionality inherent in the assess-
ment of the officials in charge of career advancement, designed to interpret the 
assimilation of the official norms of the military in a declination of personal 
submission and sacrifice of individual autonomy, the matter is further compli-
cated. On the one hand, there is the functioning of the social structure, and on 
the other, consequently, the emergence of a feeling that can be articulated in 
many, varied and even contradictory ways. Indeed, what do “official norms of 
the military” really mean? How are these values actually interpreted by officers? 
What is given more importance, the formal respect of authority or the fulfill-
ment of duty? It is evident that these questions can only be answered through 
systematic empirical research that places them at the center of its inquiry. 
However, the basic question remains: which individuals adapt better than 
others to a specific empirical articulation of promotional systems, given that the 
structure of opportunities and the system of rewards can be (and actually are) 
insufficient, inefficient and obstructed in their practicability? Merton had already dealt with 
these issues in his essay on anomie and social structure, highlighting how, given 
a need structurally induced, to which, thus, an individual has been socialized 
(e.g. success), the impracticability of institutionally legitimate means to achieve 
it may lead to a complex sequence of adaptive individual positions, ranging 
from the renunciation to rebellion to the eventual use of non-institutionalized 
and illegitimate means all the way to downright criminal means. Thus relativity 
in the openness of the social structure can transform positive tension towards 
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social progression into frustration, which could result in not only feelings of 
resignation or rebellion, but even revolutionary movements.
What impact, though, do these processes have on the cohesion of the origi-
nal groups of belonging and the behavior of individuals that belong to them? 
We have already mentioned the possible break-up of group cohesion. But what 
effects do these processes have on individuals in relation to their relationship 
with the social structure within which these processes take place?16 
These processes, that are established within specific systems of inte-
raction between individuals in which the courses of individual action take 
shape, although intentional, or triggered by the reasons that the researcher 
can reconstruct, are inherently adaptive processes. And it is this thin and invisible 
thread which holds together concepts such as relative deprivation, anticipatory 
socialization, social mobility, assimilation of values, conformism, deviance, 
conflicting pressures, conflict of roles, and which integrates them as adaptive 




And so we arrive at a metaphorical knot, that of individual autonomy. If the deci-
sion-making processes are adaptive and situated, what is left of individual freedom? 
How is individual autonomy possible? With difficulty, is the response of Merton, but 
it is possible. Indeed, the multi-belonging and complexity of social relationships are 
conditions for its affirmation. Conditions which are, at the same time, of resistance and 
16  For example, what effects will the career advancement of conformists have on the “morale” 
of  the  soldiers? Their evaluations will  also concern  the  structure  that made  those career 








adaptation. Also in this case, we can consider two examples: that of non-membership 
and that of the structural sources of instability in the set of roles.
Why is non-membership so important? Why track down the criteria that 
identify it? Because it is evident that non-membership does not only concern 
individuals who do not meet the requirements for membership, but also, and 
above all, concerns those who, despite being in possession of these require-
ments, are not part of the group. For these latter individuals, non-membership 
may be configured either as a mute and neutral absence or as claimed and antagonistic 
absence. If the absence is claimed and antagonistic, then it would be the source 
of serious structural imbalances for the group. The subjective disposition to 
the abandonment of a group of membership in favor of an aspired one of non-
belonging is only one of the possible effects of imbalances, of individual and 
structural order, that may invest a group. But the strongest pressure that the 
membership group exerts on individuals arrives when the threatened integrity 
of the group could compromise its social power. The most dangerous threats 
to the integrity of the group come from two specific types of non-belonging, 
from those who meet the requirements for membership but reject it, and 
from those who have become ex-members. In both cases, as Merton claimed 
taking explicitly from Simmel, ex-members and those who are eligible for 
membership and refuse it bring into question the very existence of the group, 
as they affirm the relativity of its norms, which are therefore disowned and 
despised by those to whom they should apply. Both plastically symbolize the 
relative weakness of the group and, correspondingly, undermine its credibility. 
The ex-members also specifically show the fragility of the loyalty that should 
anchor the members to the group. Under these perceived threats, and because 
of the need for integrity in order to wield its social power, the group exerts 
pressures that are, from the point of view of individuals, very strong.17 
17  They are particularly strong, of course, concerning ex-members. Since belonging to a group 







The fluidity of social processes, the possibility of switching from one group 
to another, the greater or lesser openness of the groups and the simultaneous 
membership of an individual to different groups, each with their own norms, 
value and demands of loyalty, all make the theme of belonging and non-belon-
ging decisive for the purposes of adaptive decision-making processes. For this 
reason the specification of the conditions within which forms of belonging and 
non-belonging assume relevance is a strategic operation, and more so for the 
former than the latter. The typology of non-belonging developed by Merton, 
who reviews the logical possibilities, not only suggests strategies for empirical 
testing in order to determine under what conditions and within what social 
process the emergence of a type of non-membership rather than another is 
more likely, but it also puts in place a conceptual map whose cells can all be 
occupied by the same individual at different stages of his life. The sociological 
braid, that this conceptual map offers in its analytical linearity, emerges as 
a labyrinth in which it is not easy to determine which system of interaction 
promotes or inhibits the actualization of each of these potentials. Under what 
conditions does aspiration fade into indifference or lead to antagonism? And 
what consequences will each of these individual choices have for the indivi-
dual himself, for other individuals with whom he relates, for the structure of 
the groups and for the social structure as a whole? Finally, considering the 
complexity of these processes and the effect they have on and in determining 
individual choices, what allows the system to be in an equilibrium, within which 
the practicability of human and social existence is conceivable?
First of all, the equilibrium is dynamic. This means that the social processes, 
as such, come into existence, change, break and reform seamlessly. In this 
sense, they resemble “life processes” according to Georg Simmel. There is no 
linearity in them, if not the analytic one set by their interpreter. Their charac-
teristic is structural instability, which, however, should not be understood as 
chaos but as a difficult, provisional and dynamic equilibrium. Analytical tools 
used to obtain order from empirical disorder must not simply define the form 
of these processes, but must identify the conditions under which the equili-
brium is constantly broken and reassembled. 
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This condition is particularly evident in the analysis carried out by Merton 
regarding the characteristics of the structural context within which the theory of 
behavior according to reference groups is to be found. Individuals occupy a set 
of positions within society, each of which originates a set of role relations, which 
are a direct consequence. The status set and the role set, which according to 
Merton constitute the elements of the social structure, describe the general state 
of the social structure as it presents itself at a given moment in time. However, 
since the positions that an individual will occupy in the course of his life are not 
established once and for all but are in fact sequential, then we should talk about 
sequences of statuses and sequences of roles. The status set indicates the set of 
social orders to which the individual belongs, while the role set identifies the set 
of structural relationships that characterize the position of the individual within 
each of these orderings. The multiplicity and variability of roles is the basis for 
the assertion of individual autonomy (see on this point Laub Coser, 1975).
The starting point is clear: to operate effectively, each and any social struc-
ture must organize these status sets and role sets, and sequences of statuses and 
of roles in order to achieve a certain degree of social order, sufficient to enable 
the majority of people, for most of the time, to have a regular social life without 
having to improvise new solutions to each new situation that comes by. The 
possible role relationships in which the individual is involved are often asym-
metrical, as these relationships occur with other individuals differently positio-
ned within the social structure, with consequent diverse and different expec-
tations, values and allocations of power. This derives from the multiplicity and 
diversity of social relations that characterize roles, but necessarily implies that 
there is a consequent multiplicity and diversity of requests, often conflicting, in 
which the individuals are invested. In addition, and as a consequence, for the 
coexistence of these multiple and diverse social relationships to be possible, 
the framework of norms and values that governs behaviors concerning the 
role sets must inevitably be poorly structured, almost ambiguous. Rather than 
a set of “instructions for use”, clearly spelled out and organized, the individual 
learns socially legitimate adaptive ways, characterized by partiality, discretion 
and ambivalence because partial, discretionary and ambivalent is the organiza-
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tion of the norms of the role set. In learning these adaptive ways, a crucial role 
is played by the relationships attributable to systems of interdependence. Since 
within these relationships it is possible to draw from a common set of unwrit-
ten and unformalized expertise and knowledge, they contribute to structure 
models of interpretation of the norms, models of relational expectations and 
models of other possible and meaningful role relationships that, once again, 
lead in the direction of a theory of behavior according to reference groups.
CONCLUSION
The motivating sentiments and conflict are two focus points of Merton’s 
sociology: the first represent the way in which the interaction context and the 
social structure intervene in the possibility of a personal choice among socially 
structured alternatives; the second is, equally, the product of social structures, 
i.e. of normative structures that contain within themselves sociological ambiva-
lences in the form of structured expectations incompatible among themselves, 
just like socially structured dyscrasias between personal expectations culturally 
induced and structured differences in the access to institutional means.
For Pareto, a theory of social equilibrium, built starting from the analysis 
of the forces that act within society, includes elements such as residues, inte-
rests, and so on, which are not harmonic but discordant.18 For him, society can 
be studied “as a system of mutually interacting particles which move from one 
state of equilibrium to another” (Pareto, 1966, p.31, cited in Heyl, 1968, p.316), 
but rather than an effort to study society as a system with a built-in homeostatic 
tendency, as in Parsons’ interpretation, the crucial passage is that this system 
“moves from one state of equilibrium to another”. What is there in this passage 
from one state to another? Disequilibrium, of course, often conflict, sometimes 
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